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Measuring the Value of Better 
Schools
Sandra E. Black
n 1993, spending on education represented 28 per-
cent of state and local government expenditures and
almost 14 percent of total government expenditures
in the United States.1 The tremendous resources
devoted to education in this country underscore the need to
identify the tools and programs that yield the greatest return
on our investment. Policymakers have sought to improve
schools in a variety of ways, ranging from increasing per
pupil expenditures or teacher salaries to creating programs
that send inner-city students to suburban schools. How,
then, do we assess the cost-effectiveness of specific initiatives
and programs?
The first step is to measure the value of better
schools. The goal is to develop a sound method of quan-
tifying how investments in educational quality relate to
outcomes. Once we are able to put a dollar value on
improvements in school quality, we can compare policy
alternatives.
In this paper, I examine two methods of measuring
the value of better schools. One involves following individ-
uals over time to determine how the quality of their
schooling affects outcomes later in their lives; the other
involves calculating parental valuation of better schools
today. I review the benefits and limitations of the two
methods, then briefly consider how these methods might
be used in evaluating policies. At the end of the paper, I
note some uncertainties affecting research in the field and
outline directions for future research.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INPUTS 
AND OUTPUTS
Determining the value of better schools is more difficult
than it seems. The effects of better schools are fully realized
only with the passage of time: the benefits of attending a
very good elementary school, for example, may stretch over a
lifetime. Nevertheless, assessing school value is easier if we
break the task down into two stages—first, determining
the relationship between inputs to a school and outputs,
and second, determining the dollar value of this increased
output (see figure on page 88).
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Inputs to a school can be characterized by a number
of variables. Teacher salaries, per pupil expenditures, and
expenditures to achieve a particular student-teacher ratio
are forms of financial input, which is what is most
commonly understood by the notion of inputs. Also
important, however, are the nonfinancial forms of input—
the mix of students in the school (an indicator of overall
peer quality), parental time and resources, and the quality
of the administration. All of these variables—financial and
nonfinancial—can be used by researchers as indicators of
school quality. 
School outputs can also be measured in a number
of ways. Improvements in test scores are an indicator of
school success. So are financial gains, such as higher
wages later in life. Intermediate to these is educational
attainment: students who attend better schools may stay
in school longer.
Once we establish a relationship between inputs
and outputs, we need to put a dollar value on the increased
output.2 In some cases, the work is already done for us:
wages earned later in life are one measure of output that
needs no quantification.3 But attaching a value to higher
test scores or to longer stays in school is a more complicated
undertaking. One way to do this is by calculating how
much people are willing to pay for a home in a location
that would allow their children to attend a better school—
an approach that essentially measures the capitalization of
better schools in house prices.
The next two sections examine in more detail how
researchers use the concepts of input and output to develop
techniques for measuring the value of better schools. The
first technique focuses on the relationship between inputs
to schools and children’s outcomes later in life; the second
looks at the links between inputs, outputs, and parental
willingness to pay. 
TRACKING INDIVIDUAL OUTCOMES
The advantage of following individuals over time is that
you can look at a number of outcomes for each individual
and assess the value of better schools in several different
ways.4 For example, you can see how better schools affect
wages, educational attainment, and job choice. Under this
approach, the optimal experiment would be to compare
two individuals who are identical in all respects (family
background, innate ability, and so forth) except for the
schools they attended. Any differences in outcomes could
then be attributed to differences in school quality. 
In practice, of course, we cannot compare two
identical individuals. In addition, educational quality is
only one of many determinants of an individual’s wage or
educational attainment, and we have imperfect controls for
the other determinants, such as family background. There-
fore, any relationship we observe between outcomes and
school quality may be tainted by “omitted variable bias” if
we overlook, or cannot control for, differences in students’
backgrounds or innate abilities. The danger is that we
will overstate the effect of school quality on individual
outcomes because we cannot adjust adequately for the
effects of these other factors.
Because of the difficulty of measuring the relation-
ship between school inputs and individual outcomes, the
conclusions reached in the literature vary significantly with
the outcome measure used. Problems such as short panels
of wage data, state-level rather than local information
about school quality, and incomplete characterizations of
family backgrounds plague these studies. 
To date, much of the literature has focused on the
relationship between the financial inputs to schools and the
wages earned by students later in life.5 When following
individuals over time, it makes sense to put a dollar value
on better schools by calculating the influence of better
schools on wages.6 Using census data, Card and Krueger
(1992a) estimate the relationship between the wageFRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / MARCH 1998 89
return to a year of school and the quality of that year of
school, where the measures of quality—the student-teacher
ratio, the term length in days, and the relative teacher
wage in the students’ state of birth—reflect the financial
resources available to schools in that state.7 The authors
find a significant relationship, suggesting that financial
inputs do matter. In a summary article (Card and Krueger
1996), they suggest that a 10 percent increase in school
spending is associated with a 1 to 2 percent increase in
earnings for students. 
This result is contradicted in work by Betts
(1995). Using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(NLSY) data set, Betts finds no significant relationship
between the financial resources available to individual
schools and students’ earnings. However, when he substi-
tutes state-level measures of school quality for measures at
the individual-school level, he, like Card and Krueger,
finds a significant relationship, suggesting that Card and
Krueger are capturing state, rather than individual-school,
effects. A criticism of Betts’ work, however, is that the data
contain information about wages early in life, and one
might argue that the effects of school quality are not
realized until later.
VALUATION AS CAPITALIZED 
IN HOUSING PRICES
Given the controversy surrounding the results of this
approach, one is left looking for other methods of measur-
ing the value of better schools. A second approach involves
determining how much people are willing to pay for better
schools. We can infer this value by examining how much
more people pay for houses located in areas with better
schools.8 Although this methodology may seem indirect—
it measures the value of better schools to parents, not the
value to the child receiving the education—it has the
advantage of putting a dollar value on current school
quality, as opposed to school quality from many years
earlier. Another advantage of the approach, as we will see
below, is that it allows the analyst to minimize the potential
for omitted variable bias.
Calculating the value of better schools this way
calls for a two-step procedure: the analyst first evaluates the
relationship between inputs—most often, financial inputs
to the school—and a measure of output—typically, the
average test scores for that school. The analyst then derives
the willingness to pay for higher test scores by examining
how school test scores are capitalized in housing prices.9
Parental willingness to pay serves as a measure in dollar
terms of the benefit of higher student test scores;10 this
benefit can then be compared with the costs of different
educational programs to determine each program’s cost-
effectiveness. 
The literature examining the relationship between
financial inputs to schools and test scores has generally
followed the methodology used to assess the relationship
between financial inputs and wages.11 Hanushek (1986,
1996a, 1996b) finds little evidence to suggest that finan-
cial inputs to a school have any significant effect on student
test scores. Even when evaluating the large number of
existing studies on this topic—some of which claim to find
a link between school financial resources and test scores—
he still concludes that the relationship does not exist. 
Using the same studies as Hanushek, however,
Hedges, Laine, and Greenwald (1994) come to quite a
different conclusion. Applying a meta-analysis technique
to evaluate the existing body of research, they find a
significant relationship between financial inputs and
achievement, such that a $500 increase in average per pupil
expenditures (approximately a 10 percent increase) leads to
a .7 standard deviation increase in student achievement. 
Other researchers agree with Hanushek that the
evidence of a relationship in existing studies is scant, but
claim that data limitations are responsible. Ferguson
(1991), for example, uses more detailed Texas data to
show that better teachers lead to improved student
performance. His conclusion is not inconsistent with
Hanushek’s position, however; Hanushek acknowledges
that a relationship exists between the quality of schools
and student achievement, but argues that this relation-
ship cannot be explained by the measurable financial
inputs to the schools.
Although the relationship between financial inputs
and outputs is unclear, it is still important to have an under-
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policymakers have nonfinancial means of upgrading school
quality. Given that improvements are possible, we can get a
relatively clean estimate of parental willingness to pay for
better schools by looking at the increase in house prices, or
capitalization, that is associated with schools whose
students, on average, score higher on tests.
When measuring the value of schools through the
capitalization of test scores in house prices, we would like
to compare two houses that are identical except that the
children in one house attend a better school than the
children in the other house. In that case, any difference in
house prices can be attributed to differences in school qual-
ity. In practice, however, measurement is complicated by
the difficulty of isolating school quality effects from better
neighborhood effects. Since better schools tend to be
located in better neighborhoods, ordinary hedonic housing
price regressions of the form
,
where  priceijk represents the selling price of house i in
neighborhood j  in school district k ,  Xijk is a vector of
house-level characteristics, Zj is a vector of neighborhood
characteristics, and Sk represents school quality character-
istics, may lead to an overstated valuation of better
schools if the available data do not provide a complete
characterization of the neighborhood studied.
Early willingness-to-pay studies tended to look at
large, heterogeneous areas in measuring the value of better
schools.12 Because these studies did not control adequately
for neighborhood differences, they were very susceptible to
omitted variable bias. To avoid such bias, more recent work
has attempted to control for neighborhood differences by
focusing on increasingly localized areas.
To understand how the literature has evolved,
consider first a study by Jud and Watts (1981) that
examined one school district—Charlotte, North Carolina.
The authors found a significant and meaningful relation-
ship between house prices and the average scores of the
schools’ third-grade students on the state test of reading
skills. However, since the geographic area under study was
quite large, the houses compared may have been in
entirely different neighborhoods. Because the authors
priceijk () log a Xijkb Zjd Skqe ijk + + + + =
controlled for only a limited number of neighborhood
characteristics, their comparison may not have been valid.
Other work has attempted to correct for this
problem by comparing houses in smaller geographic areas.
Work by Hayes and Taylor (1996) and Clotfelter (1975),
although not specifically focusing on the valuation of schools,
looked at houses within the same school attendance district,
where the attendance district is the geographical area
that defines which school within a school district a child
will attend.13 Because the authors examined a smaller
geographic area, the variation in neighborhoods across
houses being compared should have been less.
Even with the focus narrowed to attendance
districts, however, omitted neighborhood differences
might still bias estimates of the value of higher student
achievement. Two houses at opposite ends of an attendance
district may be situated in very different neighborhoods.
In a recent study (Black 1997), I address this problem
by examining an even more localized area. Specifically, I
compare the price of houses on opposite sides of elemen-
tary school attendance district boundaries in suburban
Boston. Such a strategy, in its purest form, would
restrict the area of the houses being compared to the
point where there was no variation in neighborhoods.
Imagine, for example, two houses on opposite sides of a
street that forms the attendance district boundary.
Children in the house on one side of the street attend a
different school from the children in the house on the other
side of the street, but the neighborhood is unquestion-
ably the same. In such a case, any difference in prices
would be attributable to differences in school quality.14
Because attendance district boundaries are within school
districts and within a city, variations in property tax
rates would be eliminated.
My study gets very close to this ideal comparison.
Although data limitations prevent me from looking at
houses on opposite sides of the same street, I am able to
limit my sample to houses located within a relatively short
distance of the boundary. I then narrow the sample to
houses located closer and closer to the attendance district
boundaries in order to minimize the likelihood that
omitted neighborhood characteristics are driving theFRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / MARCH 1998 91
results of the estimation. The final comparison I draw is of
houses within .15 miles of an attendance district boundary. 
The estimated equation is:
       ,
where priceiab is the selling price of house i in attendance
district a near boundary b, Xiab is a vector of house
characteristics, Kb is a vector of boundary dummies, and
testa is the measure of school quality assessed at the individual
school level. 
Using this boundary fixed-effects technique, I find
that substantial omitted variable bias exists when one relies
on the standard controls for neighborhood characteristics.
Significantly, my estimate of the value of better schools is
only about half of the normal hedonic housing price
estimate. Controlling for neighborhoods and school
financial inputs, I find that a 5 percent increase in elemen-
tary school test scores (a change of approximately one
standard deviation in the observed data) leads to an
increase in house prices of approximately 2.1 percent, or
$4,000 at the mean house price of the sample. From
another perspective, a movement from the twenty-fifth-
percentile school in the sample as ranked by test scores to the
seventy-fifth-percentile school results in a 2.9 percent
increase in house prices, or $5,500 at the mean house price.15
How can we be sure that this procedure actually
estimates the value of better schools? The study includes
a number of specification checks, including checks to
determine whether the attendance district boundaries
chosen represent neighborhood divisions. For example, I
eliminate any boundaries that could be major roads, and
I control for measurable neighborhood characteristics
(evaluated at the level of the census block group). A particu-
larly compelling check involves comparing the results for
one- and two-bedroom houses with the results for houses
containing three or more bedrooms. One would expect
individuals who live in houses with three or more bedrooms
to be willing to pay more for better schools than people in
smaller houses because they are more likely to have
children. The study very clearly confirms this expectation. 
This type of estimation provides a measure of the
value of higher test scores that is remarkably free from
priceiab () a Xiabb Kb + Fg testa eiab ++ + = log
omitted variable bias. The analyst who follows students
over time to determine how the quality of their schooling
relates to their wages later in life cannot easily control for
influences and events that affect students outside of school.
In contrast, the analyst who looks within neighborhoods
at the relationship between school quality and house
prices can significantly reduce the number of omitted
variables. 
This estimation technique does, however, have
some limitations. Studies employing the technique must
focus on small localities—in the case of my study, suburban
Boston—and, consequently, generalizing results to a
wider area requires strong assumptions. In addition, in
order to look at attendance district boundaries, such studies
must look within school districts, which is the level at
which school inputs such as spending are determined. As
a result, the variation in school spending is significantly
reduced, and calculations are based on differences in test
scores that are attributable for the most part to the
nonfinancial inputs to a school. Therefore, the variable
of interest reflects differences in teacher quality,
administrator quality, parental involvement, and school
composition (peer effects). That is not to say that the
value of high test scores will change when financial
inputs vary; we do not currently have enough information
to determine how differences in expenditures would
affect the results.
CONCLUSION
At present, there is no perfect way to measure the value
of better schools. For those charged with evaluating
school policy, the best approach would be to combine
the information acquired using both techniques
explored in this paper and to draw inferences using all
available evidence. 
Current school quality evidence indicates that
increased spending will not automatically improve
student outcomes; this finding suggests that we should
look at other ways to improve schools. Evidence from Black
(1997) confirms the value of raising test scores, particularly
through parental and administrative involvement and the
influence of school peers. 92 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / MARCH 1998
How can we use these research findings when
evaluating government policies? One way to apply my
estimate of the value of higher test scores is in the analysis
of policies involving student integration. Consider, for
example, reforms such as the METCO program in Boston,
which sends a few students from poorer urban neighbor-
hoods to wealthier suburban schools. Suppose that a
student is transferred from an inner-city Boston elementary
school where test scores average 21.27 to an elementary
school in the wealthier suburb of Belmont where test scores
average 30.67. We can measure the benefit of this test
score improvement by calculating the percentage differ-
ence in house prices for two equivalent houses in the same
neighborhood but in different attendance districts.
Using the estimate obtained in Black (1997), we find
that a house would appreciate 14 percent in value if
the family residing there acquired the right to send their
child to the elementary school in Belmont instead of the
one in Boston. When evaluated at the mean housing
price in my sample, this number in dollar terms is
approximately $25,660.16 We can then compare this
benefit with the costs of implementing the program and
thereby evaluate the program’s cost-effectiveness.
In the end, it is important to think about what we
can and cannot say. We can say that parents are willing to
pay more for better test scores, although we do not have a
clear understanding of the relationship between spending
on inputs and test scores. We can say that evidence
suggests a relationship between school inputs and the
wages earned by students later in life, but we would be
hard pressed to assign an actual dollar value to the school
inputs. Our uncertainty suggests a need for communication
with educators and other policymakers. Their knowledge
and experience can help researchers to identify the best
ways to improve student performance—through hiring
better teachers, boosting parental and administrative
involvement, creating the optimal mix of students in a
classroom, or increasing the efficiency with which schools
use financial resources. Finally, we must continue to
improve our methods of evaluation by collecting relevant
data and seeking an experimental design that eliminates
biases in our estimates.ENDNOTES
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1. See U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (1996).
2. In this paper, I focus on the private, rather than the social, valuation
of better schools. Those who believe that education is a public good
would argue that the private valuation understates the true value of
education. Two studies exploring these issues are Kane and Rouse (1995)
and Rauch (1993).
3. Note that while student wage increases are one obvious way of
putting a dollar value on better schools, this valuation does not
incorporate other, nonmonetary benefits such as a more pleasant work
environment, a more interesting job, and the like.
4. See Burtless (1996) for a review of the studies that take this approach.
5. Because the literature is vast, this paper can only highlight a few of
the more representative studies.
6. A primary source of evidence supporting the positive relationship
between school quality and earnings is work that relates relative changes
in school quality for one group to changes in relative wages for that
group. For example, a large literature focuses on changes in school quality
for blacks and the subsequent shift in black-white earnings differentials.
Card and Krueger (1992b) find that between 1960 and 1980,
improvements in the relative quality of black schools explain 20
percent of the narrowing of the black-white earnings gap. 
7. Essentially, Card and Krueger estimate individual-level wage
equations and allow for state-specific intercepts and education slopes.
They then take these state-specific education coefficients and regress
them on state school quality averages and other state-level data.
8. Another way to calculate people’s valuation of a good is to ask them
directly how much they value the particular good. This contingent
valuation approach is widely used in the environmental literature (see
Cummings, Brookshire, and Schulze [1986]). However, because the
quality of the answers obtained through this method is often doubtful,
most economists prefer to use a market-determined estimate of valuation.
9. Early work by Rosen and Fullerton (1977) shows that test scores
perform better than per pupil expenditures as a measure of school quality
in property value equations. More recently, work by Hayes and Taylor
(1996) suggests that parents actually do focus on the value added of a
school and not, as one might expect, the inputs to the school. 
10. Although parental willingness to pay is equated with the value of
higher test scores, it may in fact also be picking up the value of other
things that are correlated with higher test scores.
11. Again, see Burtless (1996) for a review.
12. See work by Kain and Quigley (1975) for an example of this
literature.
13. Hayes and Taylor focus more specifically on whether parents use test
scores or inputs to the school as measures of school quality. The authors
find that property values reflect student test scores but not school
expenditures, and they conclude that the relationship between test scores
and property values arises from an underlying relationship between
property values and the marginal effects of schools. Clotfelter uses
attendance districts to look at the effect of school desegregation on
housing prices.
14. In the construction of the data set, boundaries that represented clear
neighborhood divisions such as railroad tracks or parks were excluded
from the sample.
15. These estimates are also robust to a number of specification tests.
16. The calculation would be (30.67-21.27)*.015 = 9.4*.015 = .14,
where .015 is the coefficient on the elementary school test score in the
hedonic housing price regression estimated in Black (1997). Note that
this policy application requires strong out-of-sample assumptions.94 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / MARCH 1998 NOTES
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